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Meira Levinson 
 
  Civic education is and has been a primary aim of public schooling virtually everywhere.  
Among liberal democratic states, especially, which rely on a well-educated, civic-minded 
citizenry for their very existence, health, and perpetuation, civic education is rightly seen as 
being an essential component of public education.  Both through formal curricular mechanisms 
such as the design of history, language, and literature curricula and establishment and assessment 
of civics standards, and through institutional mechanisms such as open or comprehensive school 
admissions policies, mixed-ability classes, and recess or lunchroom rules, public schools in many 
liberal democratic societies are designed — at least in part — to promote the goals of 
establishing common civic membership and civic virtue among all students.  Historically, this 
was one of the primary arguments given in favor of publicly funding “common schools,” as 
Horace Bushnell wrote in 1853: “There needs to be some place where, in early childhood, 
[children] may be brought together and made acquainted with each other; thus to wear away the 
sense of distance, otherwise certain to become an established animosity of orders; to form 
friendships; to be exercised together on a common footing of ingenuous rivalry. . . . Without this 
he can never be a fully qualified citizen, or prepared to act his part wisely as a citizen.” Similar 
sentiments have been articulated (albeit sometimes in updated language) by educators and 
politicians ever since.  In addition, once through the doors of the common school, students were 
and are subjected to a barrage of lessons meant to teach them civic virtue: to teach them about 
their rights and obligations in a democratic society, respect for local and national political, 
cultural, and social institutions, patriotism, and so forth.  Even education in basic skills such as reading, writing, and mathematics is often justified on civic (as well as vocational and other) 
grounds, as being crucial for citizens to participate in civic affairs knowledgeably and 
effectively. 
  Clearly, these civic aspects of public education should be and are significantly shaped by 
the kind of civic structure we think we are educating children for.  Civic education in a tyrannical 
state will inevitably be significantly different from civic education in a democratic state — and 
more to the point for the purposes of this article, civic education for a democracy characterized 
by separation of powers, say, will be different from civic education for a parliamentary 
democracy.  We know in the modern American and European context that we are educating 
children to participate in a democratic polis.  We want students to learn to exercise their rights 
and fulfill their duties in a democratic setting.  But as both theorists and practitioners of civic 
education, we need to ask specifically what kind of democracy we think we are — or should be 
— educating for. 
  Recently, a number of prominent democratic theorists have started promoting 
deliberative democracy as a political goal, arguing that it is superior to more adversarial forms of 
democracy that seem to privilege power over consensus.  In this article, I critically examine 
deliberative democracy as a political goal both in itself and in regard to its implications for 
democratic civic education.  I first show that deliberative democracy is likely unjustly to 
minimize the influence of deliberants who are members of minority groups, even when all 
citizens (minority and majority group members alike) are motivated by the purest and most civic-
minded of intentions.  I then show that a deliberative civic education designed to overcome this 
problem in future generations imposes additional undesirable costs, especially on children who 
grow up in racially, economically, or religiously segregated minority communities.  These costs, I suggest, probably outweigh deliberative democracy’s putative benefits over adversarial 
democracy.  I conclude, however, that we are not immune to these challenges even here and 
now; to the extent that deliberative obligations and opportunities are already built into the 
structures of modern democratic politics, educating students effectively to participate in public 
deliberation raises significant challenges to the form and legitimacy of current public civic 
education that need to be — and have not yet been — satisfactorily addressed. 
 
The Challenge of Deliberative Equality 
  Over the past decade or two, such well-known political theorists as Jane Mansbridge, 
David Miller, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have published books advocating 
deliberative democracy as being both superior to adversarial democracy and desirable in and of 
itself.
2  Because of the prominence of these (and other like-minded) theorists, and the ensuing 
debate that they have inspired, it is not an exaggeration to say that deliberation has assumed 
center stage as the democratic ideal for the beginning of the twenty-first century.  As such, it 
merits careful scrutiny by philosophers, public policy makers, and educators. Although both the 
form of the argument and the justifications vary somewhat from theorist to theorist, there is 
sufficient overlap in their broad characterization of deliberative democracy that there’s no need 
to analyze each one separately.  Hence, for simplicity’s sake, I will focus on David Miller’s 
recent book Citizenship and National Identity, which does a good job of setting out the 
aspirations of most deliberative democrats in a clear and non-idiosyncratic way. 
  According to Miller, deliberative democracy promotes a process by which politics 
proceeds “through an open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake with the aim of 
arriving at an agreed judgement.”
3  This is in contrast to what he terms liberal adversarial democracy, which he suggests aims merely at a “fair and efficient” aggregation of preferences.
4  
In adversarial democracy, people give reasons to support their position and convert people to 
their side, but they also try to win adherents by bargaining, airing attack ads, making alliances, 
and so forth.  In deliberative democracy, on the other hand, people give and listen to reasons in 
order to reach a consensus; alliances and bargains are not made because decisions are not made 
through majority voting but through deliberation and compromise until all members of the 
deliberative body agree.  Deliberative democracy thus has many attractive elements: it fosters 
cooperation and mutual understanding rather than winning and losing (as adversarial democracy 
seems to); it purports to give all citizens a “voice” rather than just the most powerful or the most 
numerous (as tends to occur in majoritarian democracy); and it encourages citizens to make 
decisions based on “public reasons” that can be supported through deliberation rather than on 
individual prejudices that thrive in the privacy of the voting booth. 
  To achieve deliberative democracy in practice is, of course, difficult.  As Miller (and 
other deliberative democratic theorists) clearly understands, aspiration and realization are two 
very different things.  Even if it is desirable that decisions are made through deliberative rather 
than liberal adversarial processes, certain social and political conditions must be present if 
deliberative democracy is to live up to its promise.  Crucially, Miller points out, the ability (as 
opposed to merely the right) of all groups to participate equally is central to deliberative 
democracy’s rationality and legitimacy: 
Deliberative democracy may be formally inclusive, in the sense that everyone is 
permitted to enter and speak in democratic forums, but if the debate by its very nature 
favours some groups at the expense of others, it is not inclusive in a substantive sense.  
Similarly if the reasons that prove to count in deliberative settings are not reasons for 
everyone, but only reasons for particular groups or coalitions of groups, then the outcome 
cannot be described as rational in a sense that transcends group membership.  If the 
rationality claim falls, so does the legitimacy claim, for why should the disadvantaged groups accept as legitimate a procedure that relies upon methods of argument and reasons 
that they cannot share?
5  
 
As a result, it is essential that Miller and other deliberative democrats be able to show that 
deliberative democracy does enable members of all groups to participate on an equal basis, not 
only in the sense of their simply being present at the discussions, but also in the sense of their 
speaking out, being listened to and understood, and influencing the debate where appropriate. 
  There are have been many objections to deliberative democracy that focus on these two 
issues: inclusion of multiple voices and appropriate recognition of their contributions to the 
deliberation.  Iris Marion Young, especially, has raised important questions about minorities’ 
membership in deliberative political bodies and their comfort in speaking up even when they are 
included.  She and Lynn Sanders point out that women and blacks participate less often and less 
effectively than men and whites in verdict-driven jury deliberation and in adversarial settings 
such as courts or parliaments — and thus presumably in other combative deliberative settings 
such as a deliberative democracy might institutionalize.
6  In another context, Young also argues 
that minorities employ different kinds of discourse — including witnessing and storytelling — 
that will not be welcomed into or respected in deliberative discourse. 
  Both of these objections are well-taken, I believe, and should influence the shape and 
development of deliberative democracy.  Miller points out, however, that research shows there 
are ways to structure deliberation that encourage greater participation by traditionally “silent” 
groups, including evidence-based jury deliberation and non-adversarial lawmaking bodies. 
The lesson for deliberative democrats, therefore, is not that they should throw up their 
hands in dismay when it is pointed out that members of disadvantaged groups tend to 
participate less in collective deliberation, but that they should look for ways of ensuring 
that deliberation takes a form that corresponds to an evidence-driven jury, which means 
that instead of trying to move quickly to a yes/no decision, the arguments for and against 
different options should be explored without individual participants having to declare which they support.  This, it seems to me, is what good political deliberation would in 
any case require.
7 
 
Thus, properly structured deliberative institutions present a kind of “win-win” situation: they 
reduce or eliminate inequalities in people’s comfort in contributing to the deliberations, and they 
improve the overall quality of political deliberation.  Furthermore, as Miller later argues, 
deliberative institutions such as these are the best — and really the only — way of rationally 
reaching political solutions to common problems, and thus members of all groups, and especially 
minority groups, are well served by participating in them.
8 
  For the purposes of this article, I will take these responses as sufficient to answer 
deliberative democracy’s critics, because it is not the problem of unequal participation that 
worries me the most.  Rather, what concerns me more are the other aspects of participation that 
matter for deliberative democracy to be rational and legitimate: namely, all participants’ being 
listened to and understood, and their thereby actually influencing the debate where appropriate.  
Deliberative democrats, Miller among them, seem to assume a direct causal relationship between 
“relevant views and arguments” “enter[ing]” the debate, on the one hand, and the “ensuing 
discussion” “genuinely reflect[ing] the concerns, interests, and convictions” of the participants, 
on the other.  This causal inference strikes me as being wrong.  Even if members of groups from 
across the political and social spectrum are present in a deliberative body, and even the 
participants all “enter” their ideas by speaking up, it is not clear that everything that is said will 
be heard and understood in such a way as to be appropriately reflected in the deliberations.  The 
reasons for this, I believe, say a lot about the continued weakness, and potential illegitimacy, of 
this aspect of the deliberative democratic model. 
 
Minority “extremism”   One reason that equal participation (or at least “vocalization”) does not necessarily 
translate to equal appropriate consideration within a deliberative setting is that minority groups 
may have such different experiences from the majority group that they come to understand how 
the world (or the nation) works in a way that is significantly different from, and even 
incomprehensible to, members of the advantaged majority.  As a result, a member from the 
minority group may put forth arguments within a political debate that rest on premises about the 
world that are generally accepted by all of the other members of his group but are rejected as 
bizarre or crazy by the majority of the deliberative body.  In this case, the deliberation is unlikely 
to be substantively inclusive, and therefore unlikely to be legitimate from the minority group’s 
point of view.  This lack of legitimacy would be further increased if the contributions of a 
number of minority groups were regularly viewed this way by the majority of the deliberants, or 
if the group that was viewed this way constituted a substantial (albeit still minority) share of the 
population, or if the group whose ideas were regularly rejected were constituted by something 
other than belief (i.e. ethnicity, race, gender, etc.).  For although it is true that there are some 
groups in the world whose ideas really are crazy across the board, these groups are rarely very 
large, presumably not numerous within any one deliberative setting (city, district, or nation), and 
almost inevitably formed around the crazy beliefs they espouse.  If we discover, therefore, that 
the contributions of blacks, women, or Muslims in general, say, are consistently viewed in this 
way in deliberative settings, then we would be right to conclude that such deliberations are not 
substantively inclusive. 
  There is substantial evidence that this disparity in life experience and perspective exists 
in the United States between blacks and whites.  Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer show in 
their extremely comprehensive analysis of Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
9 that blacks and whites are often divided by a “chasm” of more than forty 
percentage points in their opinions about public policy issues, which they explain in part on the 
basis that blacks and whites live in “historically different worlds”
10 as characterized by culture, 
history, income, education, residence, and employment.
11  To highlight just a few examples, 
blacks and whites were divided by almost fifty points in their attitude that “people cannot be 
trusted” (85 percent of blacks agreed vs. 38 percent of whites) and that there’s “no sense 
planning for the future” (73 percent of blacks agreed vs. 27 percent of whites); twice as many 
blacks as whites (54 vs. 25 percent) agreed that government should spend more on schools even 
if that would require a tax increase, and that the government should provide financial aid for 
college students (62 vs. 30 percent); and over three times the percentage of blacks as whites (54 
vs. 14 percent) believe that providing “decent housing for all” is a government responsibility.
12  
Clearly these attitudinal and political differences would (and already do) have a huge impact on 
public policy deliberations — and on the extent to which whites and blacks are sympathetic to 
each others’ perspectives.  Although I am less familiar with the research in other countries, I 
would expect that similar examples could be found in most heterogeneous societies, including 
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Southeast Asians and whites in England, 
Palestinians and Jews in Israel and the occupied territories, Anglophones and Francophones in 
Quebec, East and West Germans, and so forth. 
  It is important to emphasize that this problem may arise even when the claims that the 
minority group makes appeal to common interests of all citizens rather than to the group’s own 
interests only, and when the norms behind the appeals are also generally shared among all 
citizens, minorities and others alike.  Because of different life experiences or other cultural 
differences, members of a minority group may put forward claims about a common interest (such as community protection through policing) that appeal to common norms, and that seem totally 
mundane from that group’s perspective, yet seem absolutely extreme from the majority group’s 
perspective.  This problem can not necessarily be solved by “drawing attention to facts that have 
hitherto gone unnoticed,”
13 as it is the facts themselves that may be a matter of debate. 
  For example, many American blacks remain extremely suspicious of government health 
care policy in the United States as a result of revelations about the government-sponsored 
Tuskegee syphilis study. This lack of trust has led to significant suspicion within the black 
community of state-mandated childhood immunizations, and even of the antiretroviral drug 
“cocktails” now used to combat HIV and AIDS.
14  A smaller but still surprisingly significant 
number of blacks also believe, or at least seriously entertain the idea — again stemming from the 
Tuskegee experience — that the CIA developed and spread AIDS in inner cities and Africa, and 
developed and sold crack cocaine in the inner cities in the 1980’s.
15  A further example of what 
might seem like “extremism” or “lunacy” to many white Americans but which is well-
entrenched in many American black communities is the belief that blacks who rise too high in 
America other than in sports or entertainment, and especially in politics, are inevitable targets for 
(possibly government-sponsored) assassination.  As a middle school teacher, teaching American 
history and English to thirteen to fifteen year-olds, I am frequently confronted by questions from 
my students in this regard.  During the Republican presidential primary season in 1999, my 
students in Boston asked me if I thought that Alan Keyes, a black candidate, would soon be 
assassinated.
16  Similarly, my students in Atlanta (all African-American) and my (black) 
colleague there who taught American history were sure that Ron Brown, the Democratic 
National Committee chairman and Clinton’s cabinet secretary who died in an airplane crash in 
the Balkans, was killed on governmental orders.  Just a few years before that, it was widely reported that celebrated Persian Gulf War general Colin Powell did not run for president because 
his wife was afraid he would be assassinated.   And finally, probably the most celebrated recent 
example of vast disparities in white and black interpretations of “the facts” was the OJ Simpson 
case, in which blacks and whites arguably subscribed to the same norms of justice but tended to 
be 180 degrees opposed in their beliefs about the justice of the verdict.
17 
  These examples remind us, I hope, of the crucial disparities in how many blacks and 
whites in America experience and interpret American life, and therefore of the often incredibly 
different interpretations of how “facts on the ground” relate to governmental policy or political 
decisions more generally.  (Again, I would expect that similar disjunctures could be found 
between other groups in the United States, and among minority and majority groups in other 
countries.)  It is unlikely that blacks and whites disagree about the desirability of good quality 
low-cost health care, of improving the prospects for terminally-ill patients by developing new 
drugs, free and open elections, or of proper channels for procedural and substantive justice.  But 
blacks who subscribe to the beliefs related above may have surprising — and possibly even 
incomprehensible or just crazy — things to say as far as most whites are concerned about public 
policies in these areas.  (Blacks are unlikely to be as surprised at white perspectives on these 
matters, since majority perspectives are better expressed in the media, etc.)  Assuming that 
whites would make up the majority of deliberative institutions, therefore, which would 
presumably be appropriate or at least acceptable since they make up the majority of the 
population, they may end up consistently rejecting blacks’ contributions to the debate as 
irrelevant or unsupportable — despite every intention to foster a mutually-respectful deliberative 
forum that is focused on finding common solutions rather than “winning.”   Now it may be too quick to say that blacks’ impotence in influencing debate under such 
conditions is the fault of deliberative democracy.  It may simply be up to black Americans to 
make the case to white Americans that their understanding of the “facts on the ground” is true.  
They need to prove that politically powerful blacks are being targeted for assassination, for 
example, as slow and painful a process as that proof may be, just like whites in America are 
finally accepting the idea that being harassed or arrested for “Driving While Black” is a real 
phenomenon, now known as “racial profiling.”  After all, white Americans have no reason to 
accept the idea that there are sinister government forces targeting politically powerful blacks just 
because many black Americans think this is true.  (I was never convinced by my colleague that 
Ron Brown was assassinated, despite our discussions about the topic, and I therefore disagreed 
with him on policy issues that related to our beliefs in this matter.)  This may be the time for 
“personal testimony” to enter the deliberation,
18 as blacks try to help whites understand the 
experience of being black in America, and thus to understand also why they believe that black 
politicians are subject to government attack, federal agencies are spreading disease and drugs in 
the inner-cities, and so forth.   
  In the meantime, however, it strikes me as being very unlikely that blacks, who make up 
12-13 percent of the American population, should necessarily accept the rationality and 
legitimacy of the deliberative democratic process, and of the political decisions that are made 
prior to white America’s acceptance of black America’s descriptions of its experiences.  
Furthermore, to the extent that similar disconnects could be found between women and men, 
religious minorities and Christians, and poor people versus wealthy people, deliberative 
democracy becomes increasingly untenable.  To take an example driven by class rather than race, 
many of my students — Puerto Rican, Cape Verdean, Jamaican, Irish, African-American, Dominican, but all essentially poor — are convinced that rents are going up in their 
neighborhoods because of a conspiracy on the part of wealthy Bostonians to exile poor people to 
the suburbs (!) and get rid of all subsidized housing now that poor people have cleaned up the 
neighborhoods for them.  Although my students undoubtedly hold these beliefs in part because 
of predictable early-adolescent misinterpretation of complex economic forces, my students are 
not alone in their convictions.  Many of their parents subscribe to the same conspiracy theories, 
and similar views are articulated by community newspapers and local activists. Whether or not 
they are right, many middle-class residents of Boston who are searching for decent housing in 
good neighborhoods will reject their arguments as absurd or paranoid — not out of ill-will, but 
because their views seem extreme.  To the extent that this pattern of mutual incomprehension — 
especially on the part of majority group members who listen to but don’t “hear” minority group 
members — to the extent that this replicates itself across racial, ethnic, religious, class, gender, 
or other lines, deliberative democracy suffers real problems with legitimacy. 
 
Unacknowledged norms and “sectarian” reasons 
  A second reason that minority groups may end up having an inappropriately small effect 
on deliberation despite having representatives who appropriately voice their concerns and ideas 
is that members of the majority group may live by certain norms, or benefit from experiences of 
the world, that they deny when these are articulated by members of minority communities.  For 
example, studies of identity development in the US have shown that white children are the only 
ones who generally do not use race to describe themselves.
19  Black, Hispanic, and Asian 
children consistently describe themselves from a very young age as being black, Hispanic, or 
Asian (as well as being tall, having brown eyes, etc.).  White children do not describe themselves as being white.  It is clearly a white privilege to see oneself as not having a race, or as not being 
even partially defined by race.  But this differential experience of race (the experience of its not 
seeming to matter, because it is taken as a default assumption — being white is “normal” in a 
way that being anything else is not) is very hard for whites to acknowledge.  Thus, in response to 
a black person’s invocation of race in a political debate, whites in America (and I expect in many 
other countries) will often complain, privately at least, “Why do blacks talk about race all the 
time?”  They have listened to the black person’s reason or idea, but they do not “hear” it or allow 
it to influence them appropriately — despite having the best of intentions — because of their 
inability to acknowledge that their own experiences have been shaped by race — but in their case 
by the privilege of white race. 
  A second example, one that occasionally comes up in the cafeteria of the school where I 
teach and that was a very live issue when I was a college student, concerns apparent minority 
self-segregation.  At Yale in the late 1980’s, fierce debates raged about the appropriateness of 
“heritage houses” and separate freshman orientations for minority students.  Furthermore, in the 
college dining halls (as sometimes in our school cafeteria now), the question would quietly be 
raised, “Why are all the blacks sitting together?”  As Beverly Daniel Tatum points out in her 
terrific book, Why Are All the Blacks Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?, whites ask these 
questions because although the process of building a racial identity involves similar activities 
and experiences for both blacks and whites, including the experiences of interacting with same-
race peer groups, it’s again an invisible process in the white community, since whites are almost 
always “naturally” surrounded by other whites.  (Notice that the question is rarely asked, “Why 
are all the whites sitting together?” — and that’s not because all-white groups don’t form.)  This same process will be quite visible for minority students in a majority setting, however, because 
they will have (visibly) to seek same-race peers out. 
  A third and final example will help take the discussion out of a solely racial context, and 
may shed further light on how good arguments may end up being excluded from deliberation for 
bad reasons, thereby putting the legitimacy of the deliberative process itself into question.  In 
Citizenship and National Identity, Miller discusses the case of a Muslim parent who tries to 
argue in favor of the establishment of Muslim schools.  In his example, the parent starts out by 
saying that “it is vitally important that a child’s religious background be supported by his or her 
school,” but this argument gets nowhere as “many people held precisely the opposite opinion.”  
The parent thus switches to arguing that “Muslim children would in many cases not flourish 
academically unless they were sent to schools where the teaching reflected their cultural values,” 
which invokes the more acceptable norm of the “principle of equal opportunity,”
20 and which 
therefore ends up (possibly) being successful.  Miller concludes from this: 
the search for agreement will itself act as a filter on the kinds of reason that prevail in the 
discussion, sectarian reasons being weeded out precisely because it becomes apparent to 
their supporters that they are not going to command wide assent.
21 
 
In other words, Miller interprets the Muslim parent’s arguments are representing a movement 
from unpalatable sectarian values (that are permitted in debate but will gain no purchase and will 
therefore naturally be filtered out) to desirable common norms. 
  I suggest, however, that the Muslim parent might have been drawing on common norms 
in both cases, but that in response to the first argument the presumably Christian majority 
weeded out a norm to which they unknowingly subscribe in practice and benefit from 
themeselves, but are unwilling or unable to acknowledge.  In other words, a norm that was so 
well-entrenched as to be invisible in the mainstream, Christian context became “sectarian” as soon as it was applied in a non-mainstream (e.g. Muslim) context.  After all, this example was 
rooted in the British context, and most British school children do have their religious background 
supported by their schools.  Bland Christianity is part of most Britons’ culture, and as such is 
supported by the religious education curriculum, school assemblies and holidays, and other 
aspects of the school calendar and curriculum.  But because they are in the majority, and because 
British Christianity is in general such a mushy thing, Christian parents in Britain don’t think 
about the fact that their children daily benefit from the application of the first norm in their 
schools.  They don’t have to subscribe to it consciously, and even have the luxury of consciously 
rejecting it in non-Christian contexts as inappropriately “sectarian,” because the Christian state 
educational establishment already subscribes to the same norm for them, much to their children’s 
benefit. 
  Again, it’s possible that in a properly respectful deliberative setting, these 
unacknowledged norms and experiences will be exposed and understood by all participants 
because whites and Christians would feel comfortable articulating their complaints and questions 
(“Why are you always obsessed with race?” “Why do you have to put religion into everything?”) 
and blacks and non-Christians would feel comfortable answering them.  If so, then blacks’ 
claims about the importance of establishing certain segregated settings such as “heritage houses,” 
and Muslim’s claims about the importance of schools’ supporting children’s religious 
background, would likely be “heard” as well as listened to.
22  But there is a question as to how 
ideal we can envision deliberative democratic institutions as being without our losing purchase 
on positive, applicable political theory and action.  Even in a solution-oriented (rather than 
victory-oriented) setting in which people interacted according to principles of mutual respect, it 
may be too much to hope that participants will expend the time and energy to engage in what is an inevitably slow and painful process of self-discovery.  As a result, I suggest that often, even in 
a mutually respectful deliberative setting, it’s likely that whites/members of other majority 
groups will shy away from claims that seem too racially-focused or self-segregating.  They will 
listen to but then reject them, and these reasons may therefore wrongly — and illegitimately, 
from minority groups’ perspectives — not gain purchase on future deliberations. 
 
“What you really mean to say is...” 
  A third way in which minorities’ influence on democratic deliberation may be 
illegitimately limited is by members of the majority group’s unintentionally but pervasively 
reinterpreting what minorities say in order to make minorities’ claims make sense to them.  This 
may be done unconsciously, or may be done as a misguided extension of respect — they may 
think that by saying or thinking, “What you’re really trying to say is...,” they are doing a service 
to the minority group.  Miller himself provides an example of this, I believe, in the following 
comment: 
If we take, not militant Islam . . . but Islamic religious identity of the more usual kind, it 
is perfectly possible for a Christian to value this identity while holding to Christian 
values.  There is likely to be sufficient overlap in the virtues embodied in the two ways of 
life for the Christian to endorse the Muslim identity, even while recognizing that this is 
not an identity he or she would wish to embrace.
23 
 
This claim misses the point, I think, about what it means to value other cultures (and highlights 
the difficulty of really “hearing” the claims made by members of other cultures).  Valuing the 
overlaps between one’s own culture and somebody else’s means that one simply values other 
cultures to the extent that they replicate or mirror one’s own (with sufficient, “open-minded” 
discount for superficial differences).  This is not the kind of respect or “valuation” that Iris 
Marion Young (to whom Miller is responding) means, and it’s not sufficient respect for a deliberative democracy to work without privileging majority groups over minority groups. For 
an individual's “concerns, interests and convictions”
24 really to count in and appropriately 
influence deliberation, the differences between his position and others’ must be recognized and 
taken into account; otherwise, he might as well not participate.  Similarly, efforts to rephrase a 
person’s position (“What she’s really trying to say is...”) often have the outcome, whether 
intended or not, of neutralizing her claims; in the process of rephrasing, the “weight of 
reasons”
25 often is shifted to fit comfortably into the other discussants’ already-present 
understanding of the matter at hand, rather than forcing people to grapple with an idea that is 
new or challenging.  As a result, dissenting individuals, especially if they come to an issue as 
outsiders whose views and experiences are different from the mainstream, run the risk of having 
their positions seemingly assimilated into the deliberations without their actually exerting 
influence in the appropriate way. 
 
Deliberative Civic Education and the “Language of Power” 
  Even within well-designed and well-intentioned deliberative contexts, therefore, the 
differential experiences of majority and minority group members can result in a loss of 
deliberative equality, and thus in a delegitimizing of deliberative democracy itself.  If 
deliberative democracy nonetheless remains a civic goal, as it does for Miller, then civic 
education must be structured so as to overcome these liabilities as much as possible.  How it 
might do so is the focus of this section. 
  For those of us who teach individuals who are members of what I have been terming 
majority groups — and this description includes not just teachers in the formal sense of the word 
but also members of mainstream media outlets, politicians, public thinkers, etc.: in other words, all people who help to shape and influence public opinion — our goal insofar as we are civic 
educators should clearly be to help members of majority groups “hear” the claims of minority 
co-deliberators without automatically rejecting them as “extreme” or “sectarian” or rephrasing 
them to fit our own beliefs and experience.  This is hard.  It is hard to teach, and hard for others 
to learn.  “Hearing” the claims made by people who seem very different from us requires a real 
exercise of thoughtful imagination combined with complex historical knowledge and 
understanding, and as those of us who teach know, it is extremely difficult to help students reach 
this point.  As a teacher of English and American history to early adolescents, I am thrilled if 
once or twice per term students really seem to grasp a complex set of ideas from the inside and to 
be able to rethink and reimagine their own experience in that historical context.  It is possible 
that I set my goals too low, but I don’t believe I do.  This kind of thoughtful, historically-, 
culturally-, and politically-informed imaginative work is difficult, and can even be painful.  
Although I advocate it strongly, therefore, we cannot trust that this type of civic education will 
on its own equip citizens to engage and fully “hear” each other in deliberative democratic 
settings. 
  On the other side, minorities can make themselves more comprehensible to majorities by 
adopting the language of the majority in setting forth their claims.  For those of us who teach 
members of minority groups, therefore, it is our responsibility as civic educators to teach our 
students how to express themselves in terms that others will naturally understand.  To put it 
baldly — as baldly as I put it to my students each year — in every country and in every 
community, there is a language of power, and if one wants to be effective through political 
dialogue (as opposed to through direct action, boycotts, radical street theater, etc.), one must 
master and use that language.
26  For members of the majority group(s) (whether these are based on class, race, religion, ethnicity, other features, or some combination), this language is usually 
easy to master because it is their own language.  It is spoken at home, reinforced in the books 
they read, and repeated in the TV and movies they watch.  Members of disadvantaged groups, 
however, have a harder row to hoe.  They have to learn to express themselves in language that 
make sense to the majority group — in the language of power —  and this may require minorities 
to shift their grammar, vocabulary, and narrative or expository form, as well as their cultural, 
political, and experiential referents in order to be understood and respected.  When members of 
minority or disadvantaged groups do not make this switch, then it is easy for even well-
intentioned majorities to reject, misunderstand, or misinterpret their arguments, as I discussed in 
the first section of this article.  If they are able to make this switch, however, then they may be 
able to reduce or eliminate one of the barriers to effective cross-cultural communication. 
  Just as it is difficult for majority listeners to learn fully to “hear” the claims of others, it is 
also difficult for minority speakers to learn to master the language of power, particularly if they 
attend all-minority schools, which is the case for students in many urban schools.  When I taught 
English in Atlanta, for example, my students attended an all-black school in which 87 percent of 
students lived at or below the poverty line; they lived in all-black neighborhoods, traveled on 
public transportation that was used almost exclusively by blacks, visited mostly black rap sites 
on the web, watched black-oriented TV, and listened to black-oriented radio stations.  Almost 
none of their daily experiences, therefore, other than those explicitly designed and directed by 
their teachers in school, exposed them to or encouraged them to use and master Standard 
American English — the “language of power” in the United States.  Most of my students wanted 
to learn to “speak right” and “write correctly” anyway, and we focused on that throughout the 
year.  But these circumstances present a huge challenge for both teachers and students.  Students have to master so much vocabulary to which they have never been exposed (two years in a row, 
the second story we read in September caused confusion because my eighth graders didn’t know 
the words ditch, wade, peasant, monarch, shore, etc.), as well as learn grammatical constructions 
that are simply different in Standard American English from Black English.  This is not to 
mention the skills they have to learn in structuring an argument, dressing appropriately, speaking 
convincingly (my students had explicitly to practice looking at the person they were trying to 
convince, because one of the continuing legacies of slavery is that in black culture in the 
American South, looking somebody in the eye is a sign of disrespect), and so forth. 
  It was also a challenge — but no less important from a civic perspective — to teach them 
all that they needed to know about mainstream — in this case, white and middle class — culture, 
history, and politics, so that they could learn to couch arguments intended for a mainstream 
audience in that context.  When we studied Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech, 
for example, we focused on how many of King’s allusions were to Shakespeare, the Bible, 
Abraham Lincoln — not to Langston Hughes, Phyllis Wheatley, Frederick Douglass, or 
Sojourner Truth, as important as those black Americans are to American history and culture.  To 
students whose exposure to mainstream culture and history is slim (they could all recite Maya 
Angelou’s poem “Still I Rise,” but none had heard of Robert Frost or Walt Whitman; and, on a 
lighter but I think no less telling note, they lost a quiz bowl round against a mostly-white team 
from the northern part of the city because they had never heard of Kurt Cobain, Nirvana, or 
grunge, but were disbelieving when I told them the other team had probably never heard of 
Master P or Mia X) — to students whose exposure to mainstream culture and history is slim, 
mastering the language of power is a daunting task, even with rhetorical masters such as Martin 
Luther King, Jr., to guide us.   This is not to say that this isn’t a worthwhile task.  It absolutely is.  Frost, Whitman, 
Lincoln, Emerson — and yes, non-Americans such as Shakespeare, Milton, Dickens, Shelley — 
are part of all Americans’ cultural heritage or “birthright,” and it massively disserves black 
Americans or other minorities if they are taught otherwise.  Likewise, Angelou, Hughes, 
Douglass, Zora Neale Hurston, Ralph Ellison, and James Baldwin are equally part of American 
culture and should thus be taught to and embraced by all Americans as well.  Americans’ 
heritage is America; I do not believe it divides down the color, class, religion, or any other line.  
But to say this is not and cannot be to minimize the vastly different exposure of and experience 
with — the “social capital” possessed by — members of majority and minority groups in 
America to these cultural, historical, and experiential norms.  Furthermore, America is not alone 
in this level of social and cultural division; examples of privileged access to and exclusion from 
the language and experience of power can be found across most societies, and thus should be of 
concern to all deliberative democrats. 
 
Civic Education for Deliberative Democracy 
  To educate future citizens to be effective members of a deliberative democracy, therefore, 
is a heavy task.  It requires that children learn how to listen to each other in such a way that they 
actually “hear” the import of claims that on the surface may seem bizarre, irrational, 
unappealing, or confused.  It also requires that children learn to express themselves in ways that 
other citizens find palatable and easier to “hear” and understand, by changing their modes of 
speech, dress, vocabulary, cultural referents, and so forth.  Neither of these lessons is easy to 
teach or to learn, and they bring challenges in their wake.    I wish in this section to focus more specifically on the implications and challenges of the 
second lesson — that minority students should learn to speak and use a “language of power” that 
is not intrinsically their own.  This aspect of deliberative civic education is of special interest to 
me — and should be of particular concern for deliberative democrats — for a few reasons.  First, 
as I will show below, this model of civic education implicates the school in partially defining a 
student’s personal identity and then attaching that to his or her civic identity — both actions that 
Miller and other deliberative democrats deplore.  Also, by emphasizing their outsider status to 
minority students, the school potentially fosters an oppositional attitude — one intended to 
enable deliberative cooperation, of course, but one that in the meantime might seem to undercut 
the trust that is crucial for deliberative justice.  These issues (and others that I will discuss below) 
cut to the heart of the deliberative democratic project, and thus should be of foremost concern. 
  Second, I concentrate on minority deliberative civic education because it is important to 
recognize that many minority students will have to learn the language of power as an explicit 
educational task, rather than more “naturally” through regular interaction with students from 
majority groups.  This is because so many minority students attend predominantly or all-minority 
schools.  While it is true that integrated schools may foster mutual understanding and the 
development of cross-cultural communication skills through students’ natural interactions in the 
classroom and on the playground, many minority students, even in liberal democracies such as 
Britain and the United States, attend schools that are virtually or totally segregated. The United 
States is perhaps most shocking when one considers segregation by race: fully one-third of black 
and Latino students attend schools that are 90-100 percent minority.
27  But it is important to 
remember that just as “majority” and “minority” refer not just to race, but also to ethnicity, 
religion, national origin, class, sexual orientation, and possibly gender, so should “segregated schools” be taken to apply to these various aspects of identity.  In the United States, many 
students attend schools that are effectively segregated by race and class; in Britain, Australia, and 
even France, many schools are effectively segregated by class, religion, and/or gender; in 
Canada, schools are purposely segregated by religion and, in Quebec, language; in Israel, 
virtually all public schools are intentionally segregated by religion and ethnicity.  Thus, minority 
students (and, correlatively, majority students) are likely to attend segregated schools in many 
democracies.  This situation is unlikely to change because democratic states cannot force 
children to attend integrated schools, and empirical evidence shows that full integration will not 
happen naturally.
28  In any democracy it is extremely unlikely that citizens would decide to 
approve the kind of heavy-handed intervention into educational institutions, property rights, local 
taxation, and so forth that the state would have to take in order to foster truly integrated schools. 
Thus, unless we undemocratically (although in my view, more liberally
29) legislated new 
patterns for integrated children’s education as a sort of paternalistic preparation for future entry 
into a new deliberative democratic order, then integrated schools will be unlikely ever to be 
sufficiently prevalent to solve the problem of cross-cultural communication barriers on their 
own.  As a result, it is important to consider the political and personal implications of 
deliberative civic education that is specifically designed for minority students. 
  A final reason that I choose to focus on civic education in minority settings is because 
that is the context in which I have experience as a teacher.  My primary teaching experiences 
have been in Atlanta, at an all-black school, and now in Boston, at a school that is 85 percent 
minority and composed primarily of first- and second-generation immigrants.  In both schools, 
about 90 percent of the student body live near or below the poverty line, so they are outside the 
mainstream in terms of class as well as race, ethnicity, and/or residency status, and although my students in Atlanta were overwhelmingly Christian — members especially of the Southern 
Baptist, AME, or sometimes Pentecostal churches, and thus members of the religious 
mainstream in the South in that respect — many of my students in Boston are either religiously 
unaffiliated or members of minority religious groups: Hindu, Buddhist, Jehovah’s Witness, 
Seventh Day Adventist, even Wicca.  My experience as a teacher, therefore, is firmly rooted in 
schools that serve minority populations, whether measured by class, ethnicity, race, or to a lesser 
extent, religion, and it is in this context that I started thinking seriously as a theorist-practitioner 
about civic education. 
  Taking all of this into account, it is clearly important to consider the implications, if any, 
of my argument that civic education for a deliberative democracy requires explicitly teaching 
minority students to master a “language of power” that is not, at least initially, their own.  I 
suggest that there are at least five difficulties posed by this conception of deliberative civic 
education. 
  First, from both a pedagogical and a more broadly civic standpoint, it is obviously 
extremely troubling to teach citizens (or future citizens) that they are “outsiders” of a civic 
community.  The school’s goal, of course, is to teach minority children (and all others as well, of 
course) that they are all civic beings who can and should function like insiders in deliberative 
settings: i.e., they should join, speak up, vote, etc.  In order to teach them to function effectively 
as insiders in the deliberative process, however, the school must simultaneously teach minority 
students that they are outsiders in the sense of having to learn and use a “language of power” that 
is initially not their own.  This places the school in a bind — as it places society in a bind.  It 
runs the real risk of reinforcing many students’ already-strong sense of being excluded or 
discriminated against.   Of course, this may also be a more honest way of teaching.  Many minority students, at 
least whom I teach, do feel excluded from and/or discriminated against by American history and 
American society — and I’m sure that many Asian students in England, Mahgrebi students in 
France, Sephardic and Arab students in Israel, and aboriginal students everywhere feel similarly 
about their countries.  It does them and us no good, therefore, to pretend otherwise.  To admit 
this explicitly, however, and especially to adopt this as a model of civic education, is to abandon 
the cherished notion that contemporary citizenship is a common right and experience.  Let me 
explain. Almost all contemporary discussions of citizenship emphasize the common heritage of 
citizenship.  To be a citizen, almost by definition, is to have the same bundle of rights and 
obligations, to “share the same legal status,”
30 and even the same civic identity (qua citizen), as 
all other citizens.  As Miller comments in a line typical of virtually all political theorists, 
“Citizenship is supposed to provide [a common] reference point.  Our personal lives and 
commitments may be very different, but we are all equally citizens, and it is as citizens that we 
advance claims in the public realm and assess the claims made by others.”
31  Consequently, it is 
to be expected that civic education would also be a common experience of all future citizens 
within a community.  Regardless of individual, personal differences, children would all learn 
equally about their rights and obligations as citizens, and would develop the same citizenship 
skills.  As I made clear earlier, however, this is not necessarily the case, neither in reality nor 
even possibly as an ideal (within the real world, that is).  Because of the different status and life 
experiences of members of advantaged majority and disadvantaged minority groups, children 
from one group may need to develop different skills from children in another group in order to 
become equally effective citizens within a republic.  As I argued before, children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds may need to learn to translate their experiences, both literally in terms of language and figuratively in terms of the references and contextual descriptions they 
use, in order to ensure that other people properly understand and pay attention to what they are 
trying to say.  Children from advantaged backgrounds just don’t need to learn these skills to the 
same extent, because these skills are not relevant to their becoming effective citizens of a 
deliberative democracy. 
  Furthermore, even if teachers’ approach to the curriculum were the same for all students, 
students’ responses to the curriculum — and their experiences of citizenship in general — would 
vary dramatically, in part due to their identity and group membership.  This is true even if 
Miller’s (extremely improbable) dream comes true of reconstructing national identity so as to be 
less historically or culturally tainted.  Miller argues: 
I want to reply to [the argument that national identities are always in practice biased in 
favour of the dominant group] first by conceding that it is descriptively true in many 
historical cases — national identities have very often been formed by taking over 
elements from the group culture that happens to be dominant in a particular state — but 
then adding that it is not integral to national identities that they should be loaded in this 
way. . . . Although in standard cases a national identity is something one is born into. . . 
there is no reason why others should not acquire it by adoption. . . . Although a priori a 
nation might define itself tightly by descent, in practice nations extend membership more 
or less freely to those who are resident and show willingness to exhibit those traits that 
make up national character.
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Thus Miller would like for nations to redefine themselves along nationally specific but non-
culturally-specific lines.  This would have the virtue, he believes, of negating the need for 
identity politics, because all citizens, no matter what their cultural background or identification, 
would be able to identify equally with the conditions for and character of national membership, 
and would therefore also feel comfortable participating as equals in the civic sphere. 
  This is a nice idea, but it is problematic on a number of levels.  Even if national identity 
is not culturally biased, there is inevitably cultural bias within the citizenry who make up the 
nation, and in order to be effective politically, one has to be able to play to that bias, or be comprehensible within that culture.  It would be inefficient, to say the least, to try to participate 
in political deliberation in England but not couch arguments in terms that whites and Christians 
are likely to be sympathetic to.  Also, even if a gradual recreation of a national character is 
possible — for example, even if England or Britain were to find or create symbols of nationhood 
that are inclusive and could be adopted by anyone who is resident and wishes to become a citizen 
(i.e., not the Union Jack, fox-hunting, “English gentleman,” servant of empire, etc.) — one still 
has to deal with the history of the nation as it stands.  England could not simply ignore the 
downsides of its colonial history in its program of civic education, even if its history and 
experience as an empire no longer were central to English identity.  After all, the lives and 
histories of most ethnic minority families in England — whether Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, 
Afro-Caribbean, African, Irish, Arab, Chinese, or other — have been directly shaped by English 
colonialism, missionarism, racism, and the “white man’s burden.”  The fact that England has 
(according to this counter-factual example) reconstructed its national identity in a non-culturally 
biased way is good, but it does not and cannot remove the sense of distance, exclusion, and/or 
ambivalence about citizenship and subjecthood that many minority students who are aware of its 
history are likely to feel. 
  Likewise, America has some powerful symbols of nationhood that are unifying and to 
some extent can be adopted by all citizens as a common heritage: the Constitution, Declaration 
of Independence, flag, “American Dream,” etc.  But it, too, cannot thereby simply ignore the 
parts of American history that contradict these more desirable aspects of American nationhood: 
slavery, the destruction of Native American tribes and their land, isolationism and anti-
immigrationism, segregation, etc.  As a result, despite the common heritage of the Constitution 
and the American Dream (for example), a black person’s civic identity in America is extremely likely to be different from a white person’s American civic identity.  Acts of civil injustice — 
from slavery through Jim Crow through Tuskegee — have partially shaped the family history of 
every black person whose family has lived in America for longer than a few decades (as well as 
more recent immigrants, realistically speaking).  White children’s family histories rarely show 
the scars of racial injustice in the same way; generally, parents, grandparents, and other ancestors 
benefited from the white privilege bestowed by these laws, even if they were personally opposed 
to them, or even if they ignored politics altogether.  (Their histories may also have been marked 
and stunted by prejudice against ethnic whites or anti-Semitism, but that is separate from anti-
black hatred.)  This is not to say that entrenched civil injustice and racism did not harm whites; it 
did certainly on psychological and moral grounds, and potentially in other ways as well.  (Some 
psychologists argue that the current antisocial and violent behavior of some white adolescent 
boys and men derives from anger resulting from having been raised with an implicit sense of 
entitlement that is no longer fulfilled.)  But it harmed them differently from how it harmed 
blacks. 
  It does not require educating children to be explicitly race-conscious, therefore, to have 
black children react to American racial history in a significantly different way (with an added 
personal sense of injustice, say) from how white children might.  Both black and white children 
might be equally appalled when they learn about the Jim Crow laws or about white resistance to 
school desegregation orders.  How that sense of horror is channeled, however, may differ for 
whites and blacks.  White children may feel a sense of shame that blacks will not feel.  Blacks 
may feel alienated from a country that would do these things, whereas whites may simply feel 
relieved that their country has grown up and become more overtly just.  Furthermore, the 
connections students draw to their own lives may well be different.  This is especially likely to happen in segregated schools, where teachers and the students themselves both often reinforce 
racialized readings of history and literature.
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  What does this mean for our conception of civic education in a deliberative democracy?  
In addition to the first problem of reinforcing minorities’ sense of alienation by stressing their 
“outsider” status, a second, related problem arises that it is likely to be harder to build the kind of 
trust that deliberative democrats correctly argue is required for deliberative democracy to 
function effectively and justly, since minorities will be consistently aware of working in a world 
that is partly not their own.  Miller comments, “[F]or deliberative democracy to work well, 
people must exercise what we might call democratic self-restraint; they must think it more 
important that the decision reached should be a genuinely democratic one than that it is the 
decision that they themselves favour.  This depends in turn on the level of trust that exists in the 
deliberating body: people will tend to behave in a democratic spirit to the extent that they believe 
that others can be trusted to behave likewise.” 
34  Although Miller is right about the importance 
of trust, it is easy to see how minority citizens might find it hard to put trust in mainstream 
deliberative institutions, given the tainted history of so many liberal democracies. 
  Third, this model of civic education implicates the school (and almost always the state 
school, since most minority children, with the possible exception of religious minorities, attend 
state schools) in partially interpreting the relationship between personal identity and civic 
identity.  In some sense, the school at least temporarily “fixes” what a minority student’s identity 
means in the civic context by stressing the knowledge and skills particular to minority 
membership in a deliberative democracy.  Thus, black students are consciously and intentionally 
introduced to a civic education curriculum different from that taught to white students, and 
within that curriculum they are explicitly taught that as blacks, they must develop particular skills in order to be successful as citizens.  This is again extremely problematic for deliberative 
democrats such as Miller, who opposes institutionalizing in any way a politics of recognition — 
but it is also a necessary component of civic education, I argue, if minority children are to learn 
how to participate most effectively in deliberative political institutions. 
  Two additional problems with this conception of deliberative civic education are 
unrelated to “outsider” vs. “insider” status.  One of these is the problem of translation.  Merely 
learning the language of power does not mean that every good idea can necessarily be expressed 
within it.  This may be especially clear if we consider the cultural, political, and social referents 
implicit within majority dialogue.  A religious conservative, for example, may be against 
pornography for religious reasons but know that these reasons will not be “heard” by a secularly-
oriented majority.  She may choose, therefore, to translate her arguments into secular terms — 
arguing not that pornography desecrates God’s sacred vessel, for example, but that it promotes 
violence against women.  While this act of translation may allow her to promote her ultimate 
goal of banning pornography, however, it also distorts her position in the meantime.  This is not 
the reason that she is against pornography (she may in fact be more convinced by research 
showing that soft-core pornography reduces violence against women by giving men another 
outlet), and she would not be satisfied by a ban simply on violent, hard-core pornography.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the notion that deliberative democracy promotes mutual 
communication and understanding, this woman is reduced virtually to lying to her fellow 
citizens; she is promoting an action based on reasons to which she does not necessarily 
subscribe, and cannot give the reasons that she truly believes in.  Members of other minority 
groups — blacks, the poor, recent immigrants — may feel the same way in other situations.  
Thus, teaching students to translate their ideas, thoughts, and concerns into language that members of mainstream groups will understand does not guarantee that they will feel free and 
able to express themselves honestly and openly, free of distortion. 
  Finally, learning the language of power may in some, even many, cases extract the 
ultimate cost of permanently altering students’ personal identities.  Short-term accommodations, 
made over and over again, can have transformative long-term consequences in the form of 
assimilation and loss of original language.  Being effective in a deliberative setting in many ways 
is a function of “fitting in,” of seeming reasonable rather than radical, an insider rather than an 
outsider.  To what extent can we expect individuals to fit themselves into mainstream dialogue, 
repeatedly and completely, without expecting that they will eventually fit permanently into the 
mainstream — that they will assimilate?  If this is a goal of civic education — and it certainly 
has been one historically in many societies — then well and good.  There is no problem with this 
model of civic education for a deliberative democracy.  But if assimilation into the mainstream is 
not an explicit goal of civic education today, then we may be led to question a model of civic 
participation — that of deliberative rather than adversarial democracy — that requires so many 
individuals to shed their own languages, their own experiences, their own cultural or social 
referents, at the door of the polis. 
  One possible response to these problems is to abandon a deliberative model of democracy 
for a different democratic model — probably adversarial democracy.  Insofar as adversarial 
democracy requires that individuals master the technologies of power — building alliances, 
gaining media exposure, lobbying effectively, voting strategically, etc. — rather than only the 
language of power, it would enable a form of civic education that might be less problematic than 
what I have described so far.
35  In an adversarial democracy, for example, Hispanics or Muslims 
or gays may exert influence and power not by convincing politicians of the reasonableness of their positions, but by convincing those politicians that their positions must be treated as 
reasonable if they want to earn the Hispanic/Muslim/gay vote in their (re)election bid.  Thus, for 
example, almost nobody in mainstream American society in 1999 thought that six year-old 
Cuban refugee Elian Gonzales should be forcibly kept in the United States or that his Cuban 
father’s custody claims should be rejected.  But because of the strategic voting power of Miami 
Cuban-Americans, many mainstream media outlets and politicians (including Al Gore, who was 
even then acutely aware of Florida’s potential importance in the 2000 presidential election) 
treated these claims seriously nonetheless.  Cuban-Americans in Miami did not have to convince 
anyone of their position, as would be required in a deliberative democracy; rather, they used their 
power as a voting block to compel people to treat their position as reasonable despite their 
apparent extremity.  Applying this example to the design of civic education, this suggests that in 
a liberal adversarial democracy, all students might learn the same skills of employing the 
technologies of power, regardless of their identity or minority status, and be encouraged to use 
these technologies to influence politics, achieve their political aims, and strive for liberal 
democratic justice.  All students under this model can be taught to think of themselves as insiders 
of various groups — as well as learn how to organize communities or interest groups and to 
build coalitions in which they will be insiders — as a means of helping them achieve appropriate 
political power and influence.  As a result, liberal adversarial civic education would seem to free 
the state school from distinguishing among students based on its perception of their personal 
identities and group membership, and also free students from having to learn that they must both 
acknowledge and overcome their outsider status in order to succeed in the political realm. 
  Despite the attractions of this approach, however, it is clear that adversarial democracy 
— which is essentially what exists now in most modern liberal democracies — does not solve everything.  After all, the pedagogical dilemmas that I have described throughout this essay stem 
from my experience as a teacher now, teaching in the context of adversarial democracy, not just 
as a teacher educating for deliberative democracy.  Adversarial democracy still requires that 
individuals master the language of power if they wish to be politically efficient and effective.  
Also, even if the school under this model is not implicated in “fixing” students’ identities, the 
technologies of adversarial democracy — bloc voting, building strategic alliances, keeping 
people “on message” — would seem to promote group identification and identity politics above 
a sense of common citizenship and a shared political mission.  The Elian Gonzales case 
illuminates how much turned on group loyalty and narrow interest politics; this cannot be what 
we, and certainly not deliberative democrats such as Miller, hope to foster in developing liberal 
democracies.  Finally, even if all students can equally benefit from learning how to master the 
technologies of power in a liberal democracy, it will be patently clear to children and adults alike 
that these technologies are not equally distributed or effective.
36  Teachers will still have to 
confront the pessimism and frustration of minority students who feel that the majority will 
always have the upper hand in employing the technologies of power — in gaining access to the 
nightly news, financing campaigns, lobbying the right people, even using the police to intimidate 
other groups in subtle but effective ways.  Certainly students’ study of history and culture in 
many liberal nations will not dissuade them from this conclusion.  As a result, teachers and 
schools will still have to grapple with students’ feelings of being outsiders, and will have to find 
ways to convert disaffection and cynicism into activism and involvement.  In these respects, 
teachers, schools, and states face similar challenges in adversarial and deliberative democracies 
alike.   Hence, the questions still remain: is there a single sense of civic identity that children can 
adopt and sustain even in the face of the divisiveness of past and recent civic history, and 
students’ inevitably different reactions to it? Likewise, even if minority children do have to learn 
to think of themselves as partial outsiders in order to improve their capacity to function as 
insiders in civic life, can this be taught in a way that doesn’t alienate them from civic life 
altogether?  Can a school successfully teach minority children that they are full civic beings who 
should try to function like “insiders” in deliberative settings (i.e. they should join, speak up, vote, 
etc.) while simultaneously teaching them that they are “outsiders” in the sense of having to learn 
and use a language of power that is not their own?  The answers to these questions are crucial to 
the work of deliberative democrats, both because of their centrality to the deliberative process 
and because of the fine line they walk between fostering civic egalitarianism and promoting an 
identity politics of recognition.  I must confess that I don’t know the answers to these questions 
— they are some of the reasons that it remains interesting to be a teacher.  But I hope that the 
answers to these questions are (or can become) “yes,” for the sake of national unity within liberal 
democracies, and because we want all future citizens ultimately to view citizenship positively, as 
an opportunity to participate in political deliberation and to enact positive political change.  
These are dilemmas in such quasi-liberal states as America and Britain today, and would be 
dilemmas in the deliberative democracies of tomorrow, as well. 
                                                 
1 This article is a revised and updated version of material previously published in Daniel Bell and Avner de Shalit, 
Forms of Justice: Critical Perspectives on David Miller's Political Philosophy  (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2002), as well as in the Philosophy of Education Yearbook 2000 (Philosophy of Education Society).  I am grateful to 
the publishers for allowing me to reprint portions of those earlier articles here.  I would also like to thank Rob Reich, 
Ajume Wingo, Sanford Levinson, Marc Stears, Cecile Fabre, and participants in the Nuffield Miller Conference 
(July 2000), Teachers College Philosophy and Education Seminar (April 2001), Mid-Atlantic States Philosophy of 
Education Society spring conference (April 2001), Citizenship Education, Political Theory, and the Problem of 
Language Conference (November 2001), and the Philosophy of Education Society Annual Meeting (April 2002) for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts.                                                                                                                                                              
2 Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1980); David Miller, Citizenship and 
National Identity (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and 
Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
3 Miller, Citizenship and National Identity, p. 9. (Hereinafter CNI.) 
4 Miller, CNI, p. 9. 
5 Miller, CNI, p. 144. 
6 Miller, CNI, pp. 142-7. 
7 Miller, CNI, p. 146. 
8 See Miller, CNI, pp. 147-160, for a spirited and convincing argument against the idea that “greeting,” “rhetoric,” or 
“personal testimony” should replace the deliberative ideal, and against the idea that some minority groups are 
culturally unable to present solutions supported by reasons in a deliberative forum. 
9 Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
10 Smith and Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies, p. 11. 
11 Smith and Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies, pp. 10-17. 
12 Smith and Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies, Tables 2.2, 2.5, 2.6. 
13 Miller, CNI, p. 56. 
14 See M.E. Guinan, “Black communities’ belief in ‘AIDS as genocide’. A barrier to overcome for HIV prevention,” 
Annals of Epidemiology, 3 (2), March 1993, pp. 193-5; S.B. Thomas and S.C. Quinn, “The Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, 1932 to 1972: implications for HIV education and AIDS risk programs in the black community,” American 
Journal of Public Health, 81 (11), Nov. 1991, pp. 1498-1505; K. Siegel, D. Karus, E.W. Schrimshaw, “Racial 
differences in attitudes toward protease inhibitors among older HIV-infected men,” AIDS Care, 12 (4), Aug 2000, 
pp. 423-34. 
15 An excellent web site, essentially structured as an annotated bibliography, that details the history and media 
coverage of black American’s suspicions about connections between the CIA and drugs is “Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1995-2000: San Jose Mercury News Story on Nicaraguans, Crack, and the CIA,” 
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/intellisite/cia1990s_folder/cia1995-96crack.html.  See also “Nation of Islam 
investigates possible CIA crack connection,” (CNN, Oct. 13, 1996), www.cnn.com/US/9610/13/farrakhan/; 
Kathleen Koch, “CIA disavows crack connection; many skeptical,” (CNN, Oct. 23, 1996), 
www.cnn.com/US/9610/23/cia.crack/; and Daniel Brandt and Steve Badrich, “Pipe Dreams: the CIA, Drugs, and the 
Media,” www.pir.org/news16.html. 
16 I didn’t answer them directly, although I did tell them that he was (objectively) such a kook that he would never 
get far enough to become a significant target. 
17 For national survey evidence of black-white opinion disparities on all of these issues, see Smith and Seltzer, 
Contemporary Controversies, especially chapter 5. 
18 See Miller, CNI, p. 156. 
19 Beverly Daniel Tatum, Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? (New York: Basic Books, 
1997).  For a partially dissenting view, see Marguerite A. Wright, I’m Chocolate; You’re Vanilla: Raising Healthy 
Black and Biracial Children in a Race-Conscious World (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998). 
20 Miller, CNI, p. 151. 
21 Miller, CNI, p. 151. 
22 I should note that even if these reasons are “heard,” they won’t necessarily decide the debate in favor of “heritage 
houses.”  Considerations of racial identity development do not trump all other arguments, just as one may 
acknowledge the role that self-segregated minority groups play in fostering adolescents’ development of racial 
identity without necessarily favoring any particular self-segregation proposal. 
23 Miller, CNI, p. 74. 
24 Miller, CNI, pp. 146. 
25 Miller, CNI, pp. 146. 
26 I am indebted in this paragraph and in the discussion that follows to Lisa Delpit’s phenomenal book, Other 
People’s Children (New York: The New Press, 1995). 
27 See Gary Orfield and John T. Yun, “Resegregation in American Schools,” June 1999, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/groups/civilrights/publications/resegregation99.html.  See also Gary Orfield, Susan E. 
Eaton, and The Harvard Project on School Desegregation, Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of 
Brown v. Board of Education, (New York: The New Press, 1996).                                                                                                                                                              
28 Gary Orfield, in fact, provides compelling empirical evidence that school segregation is actually increasing in the 
United States, now that many integration-oriented court orders are being lifted and districts are free to set policies on 
their own again. See Orfield, Eaton, and The Harvard Project on School Desegregation, Dismantling Desegregation. 
29 See Meira Levinson, The Demands of Liberal Education (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) for an extended 
liberal argument in favor of forcible school integration policies. 
30 Miller, CNI, p. 41. 
31 Miller, CNI, p. 41. 
32 Miller, CNI, p. 35. 
33 “Racialized” should not necessarily be interpreted to mean prejudiced or discriminatory.  When I reflected on my 
teaching in Atlanta, where I taught English in an all-black school, I was stunned to realize how racially-oriented I 
was (and also certainly my colleagues were) in selecting course materials, in approaching the texts, and in drawing 
connections for our students to modern life.  None of us was prejudiced, I believe; we just oriented all aspects of the 
curriculum, possibly too much, to the African-American context in which we were teaching. 
34 Miller, CNI, p. 22. 
35 I am grateful to the Nuffield Miller Conference attendees, and especially to Marc Stears, for pushing me on this 
point. 
36 Miller makes this point well in CNI, p. 159. 